Theoretical Justification and Practical Pathways for the Accelerated Maturity of Capital Contribution Obligations under the Time-Limited Capital Subscription System

Main Article Content

Abstract

The newly revised Company Law establishes both the Time-limited Capital Subscription System and the accelerated maturity mechanism for shareholders’ capital contributions, which has positive significance for the development of the corporate capital system. In balancing the interests among shareholders, the company, and its creditors, the new law tends to favor the company and its creditors.This article conducts a specific analysis of the acceleration mechanism of shareholders’ capital contributions, including clarifying the realization paths of the two types of claimants, arguing that “inability to pay” should be adopted as the standard for determining when a company “cannot pay due debts,” and interpreting the statutory provisions as applying the Assets Entry Rule to ensure the equitable satisfaction of creditors’ claims. At the same time, in practice, proper coordination between the maximum subscription period system and the acceleration mechanism is necessary to give full play to their value.

579 775
PDF Downloads Trend
Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

Copyright remains with the author(s). All articles are published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). This license permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution, and reproduction in any medium or format, provided that appropriate credit is given to the original author(s) and the source, a link to the license is provided, and any changes are indicated.

How to Cite

Zhang, L. (2026). Theoretical Justification and Practical Pathways for the Accelerated Maturity of Capital Contribution Obligations under the Time-Limited Capital Subscription System. Journal of Law, Psychology, and Communication Studies, 2(1), 65-71. https://doi.org/10.63802/jlpcs.V2.I1.137

References

北京西城法院.(2024).西城法院审结首例适用新公司法加速到期规则案件. https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/21_oRaYH_GdOlzZ5KI9e_w

毕玉谦.(1999).举证责任分配体系之构建.法学研究,(2),46-59.

丁勇.(2023).股东出资期限对抗的矫正与规制.北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),(6),151-161.

付慧姝,范成龙.(2016).股东出资责任加速到期制度的法律适用.江西社会科学,(12),139-146.

蒋大兴.(2019).论股东出资义务之“加速到期”——认可“非破产加速”之功能价值.社会科学,(2),98-113.

李晓楠.(2020).利益平衡视角下股东出资加速到期制度构建.河南财经政法大学学报,(3),43-51.

刘贵祥.(2024).关于新公司法适用中的若干问题.法律适用,(16).

刘迎霜.(2023).资本认缴制:股东出资自由与公司资本自治.政治与法律,(8),164-176.

沈朝晖.(2024).重塑法定资本制——从完全认缴到限期认缴的动态系统调适.中国法律评论,(2),51-67.

汪青松,张汉成.(2022).认缴登记制下缴资难题破解的体系化进路.社会科学研究,(5),89-97.

杨秋林,杨士民.(2023).论认缴出资的加速到期责任.江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),(5),95-102.

张旭昕.(2023).论存续中公司股东出资义务的加速到期.学习与探索,(8),97-106.

张玉敏,周清林.(2002).“入库规则”:传统的悖离与超越.现代法学,(5),101-107.

赵旭东.(2024)新公司法讲义.法律出版社.

朱慈蕴.(2021).中国公司资本制度体系化再造之思考.法律科学(西北政法大学学报),(3),48-64.

朱慈蕴.(2022).股东出资义务的性质与公司资本制度完善.清华法学,(2),75-92.

Similar Articles

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.